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Abstract 
1Wo disparate machine learning approaches have received considerable 
attention. These are explanation-based and similarity-based learning. The 
bastc goal of an explanation-based learning system is to more efficiently 
recognize concepts that tt is already capable of recognizing. The learning 
process involves a knowledge-intensive analysis of an environment-provided 
example of a concept in order to extract its characteristic features. The bastc 
goal of a similarity-based system. on the other hand. is to acquire descriptions 
that allow the system to recognize concepts it does not yet know. Although they 
have been applied with some success to problems in a variety of domains. both 
methods have clear deficiencies. Explanation-based learning assumes that a 
system will be provided with an expliCit domain theory that is complete. correct. 
and tractable. This assumption is unrealistic for many complex. real-world 
domains. Similarity-based learning suffers because of its lack of an explicit 
theory. Since the two methods are complementary in nature. an obvious 
solution is to augment systems using one approach with techniques from the 
other. This survey discusses machine learning systems that integrate 
explanation-based and similarity-based learning methods such that one is 
incorporated primarily to handle a defiCiency of the other. Although sufficient 
background material is provided that the reader need not be familiar with 
machine learning. general knowledge of AI is assumed. 
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Recently two disparate machine learning approaches have received considerable 
attention. These are explanation-based and similarity-based learning. The basic goal of an 
explanation-based learning system is to more effiCiently recognize concepts that it is already 
capable of recognizing. The learning process involves a lmowledge-intenstve analysis of an 
environment-provided example of a concept in order to extract its characteristic features. The 
analysis is in the form of an explanation describing why the particular instance is a member of 
the concept to be learned. The basic goal of a similarity-based learning system. on the other 
hand. is to acquire descriptions that will allow the system to recognize concepts it does not yet 
lmow. Many examples of a concept are given to the system. These are compared against each 
other in order to find shared features that are assumed to define the concept. 
Both explanation-based and similarity-based learning methods have been applied With 
some success to problems in a variety of domains. Both methods have clear problems. 
however. Explanation-based learning assumes that a system will be supplied with an expliCit 
theory of the domain of application that is complete. correct. and tractable. This assumption is 
clearly unrealistic for most complex. real-world domains. Similarity-based learning suffers 
because of its lack of an explicit theory of the domain. The method requires that human 
intervention playa large role in tailOring input examples and the language describing them in 
such a way as to allow a system to choose a set of features to define a concept. Less tailoring 
of the examples leaves a system open to the possibility of not converging on the best definition 
for a concept. or any at all. due to the computational complexity. 
Since the two methods are complementary. a natural solution to the problems 
encountered in explanation-based and similarity-based learning is to augment systems using 
one approach with techniques from the other. This survey discusses machine learning 
systems that integrate explanation-based and sfrnilarity-based learning methods such that one 
is incorporated primarily to handle a deficiency of the other. Spec1flcally. it describes the use 
of similarity-based learning to handle inadequacies in explanation-based learning systems' 
domain theories. and the use of explanation derivation in gtving similarity-based learning 
systems more freedom to select feature sets and appropriate representations. 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 introduce explanation-based and similarity-based learning 
methods. Section 2.3 compares the methods. discussing benefits and deficiencies of each. The 
remainder of the paper is devoted to the discussion of problems with the approaches. and 
systems that have been deSigned to address them. Section 3 discusses the augmentation of 
explanation-based learning systems with similarity-based learning in order to compensate for 
incompleteness (3.1). incorrectness (3.2). or intractability (3.3) of the relevant domain theories. 
Section 4 discusses the use of explanation derivation to direct the search of similarity-based 
learning for more appropriate representations and for the concepts they are to describe. 
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2 An Overview of Explanation-Based and Similarity-Based Learning 
2.1 Explanation-Based Learning 
Explanation-based learning (EBL)l (e.g .. [DeJong 81: DeJong 83: DeJong and Mooney 
86: Mitchell et al. 86: Silver 86: Winston et al. 83)) is a deductive machine learning approach In 
which a def1n1tion of a concept is derived. usually after observing only a single example of that 
concept. To understand this method on an Intuitive level. consider a robot operating In a room 
containing household objects. In order to manipulate the objects In its world. the robot must 
have a mechanism for recognizing them. For e.xample. it might require the ability to recognize 
cups. 
Consider a robot that has been provided with a knowledge base of rules describing 
objects in its world and their characteristics. The rule base would be the domain theory as it 
constitutes the robot's representation of its domain of application. Some rules from this 
domain theory might be: 
LIGHT (X) ~ PART-OF (X,Y) ~ ISA(Y,Hk~LE) ~ LIFTABLE(X) 
that states that If an object is light and has a handle then it Is liftable. and: 
ISA(X,OPEN-VESSEL) ~ STABLE (X) ~ LIFTABLE (X) ~ ISA(X,CUP) 
that states that If an object Is an open vessel that is liftable and stable then It Is a cup. 2 Now 
assume that the objects In the world are represented by predicates that describe basic 
structural features of the objects. such as FLAT and LIGHT. Because the domain theory 
relates these primitive predicates to higher level concepts such as CUP. it can be used by the 
robot to deduce that a particular object is or 15 not a cup. The deductive process. generally 
implemented by a theorem-prover. is computationally expenslve. however. A major goal of 
explanation-based learning is to improve the performance of such systems. 
Input to EBL is the name of the concept to be learned. an instance of it. and a domain 
theory to be used to prove that the Input instance is an example of the given concept. In the 
robot domain described above. the concept to be learned might be lSA(X.CUP). The example of 
a cup might be the representation of a particular blue ceramic cup: a conjunction of primltives 
such as COWR{obj I.BLUEJ. MADE-OF(obj I.CERAMIC). etc. The domain theory would include 
rules such as those given above. 
IEBL Is sometimes referred to In the machine learning llterature as explanaUon-based generalizat10n (EBGJ. 
2-r'hese examples are modified from Mitchell et aL's paper on a unifying framework for the method of explanaUon-
based learning IMltchell et aI. 86). All examples from this domain presented here are based upon examples from their 
paper. 
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The goal of EBL is to create a general concept description based upon the predicates 
describing the particular example. such that the general description is Justified by the proof 
derived to show that the example was a member of the concept to be learned. The first step of 
the learning process is to use the domain theory to generate such a proof. The proof is 
sometimes called an explanation. The explanation for the input described in the preceding 
paragraph is shown in Figure 1. 3 Note that not all predicates used to describe the input 
example are actually found in the explanation. It is assumed that these. for instance the color 
of the cup. are not relevant to the definition of a cup. 
ISA(objl,CUP) 
ISA(objl, OPEN-VESSEL) STABLE (objl) LIFTABLE (objl) 










Figure 1: Explanation of Cup 
The next step of EBL is to maxJmally generalize the description of the input example With the 
constraint that the derived proof structure still holds. Many constants appearing in the proof 
can be made Variables as shown in Figure 2. In some cases the generalization must be 
constrained. For example. OPEN-VESSEL was not generalized. 
The general description of a cup. deductively validated by the proof derived. Is shown in 
Figure 3. It can be used by the robot to efficiently recognize cups. because the robot can now 
simply apply a single rule rather than having to construct a proof. (It has more recently been 
shown by [Minton 88) that there are cases in which the application of a single rule is less 
effiCient than proof construction due to the complexity of determining that the rule applies.) In 














Figure 2: Generalized Explanation of 
Cup 
domains such as that of solving algebraic equations. where proofs can resemble traces of 
problem solving steps. the generalized proofs may be stored to be applied automatically to 
analogous examples later. The result of explanation-based learning as described here is not to 
have learned a concept that could not have been recognized. but to learn a more effiCient 
definition of such a concept. 
PART-OF (X,A) A ISA(A,CONCAVITY) A UPWARD-POINTING(A) 
/\ 
PART-OF (X,C) A ISA(C,BOTTOM) A FLAT (C) 
LIGHT (X) A PART-OF(X,B) A ISA(B,HANDLE) 
~ ISA(X,CUP). 
Figure 3: General Definition of Cup 
The discussion above is intended to give an intuitive view of explanation-based learning. 
A more formal discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. (But see [DeJong and Mooney 86: 
Mitchell et aI. 86): a survey of EBL systems is presented in [Ellman 89).) The key ideas of EBL 
are: Explanation-based learning is a method in which a single example is analyzed and then 
generalized by a system. In order to perform the analysis. a system must possess a domain 
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theory that is complete and correct. and the process of analysis must be tractable. The 
analysis. or derivation of an explanation. will often be performed by a deductive inference 
mechanism such as a theorem-prover. Depending upon the domain. an explanation may be a 
deduction of the flavor in the example above. or. more generally. any transfonnation of an 
initial problem state to a goal state. Generalized explanations. in addition to leruned general 
definitions. may be saved so that they need not be re-derived. A summary of EBL is given in 
Figure 4. 
INPUT: name of a concept to be learned; 
specific example of the concept; 
domain theory. 
OUTPUT: general (efficient) definition of the concept: 
generalized explanation. 
METHOD: 1. derive a proof that the example is an instance of 
the concept. 
2. maximally generalize the proof while maintaining 
its correctness. 
3. extract a general definition from the generalized 
explanation. 
Figure 4: Summary of Explanation-Based Learning 
2.2 Similarity-Based Learning 
Similarity-based learning (SBL) (e.g .. [Fisher 87; Lebowitz 87; Michalski and Stepp 83; 
Mitchell 78; Quinlan 86; Winston 72)) is an empirical technique that involves comparisons 
among large numbers of input examples. The input examples are compared in order to find 
similarities and dJ.fferences among them. Sl.milarities are generally assumed to define a useful 
concept. 
To get a flavor of the method. consider the robot world described in the preceding 
section. There Is a robot operating in a room containing household objects. Again the robot 
must be able to recognize objects in this room. such as cups. Unlike in the EBL setting. this 
robot does not have a domain theory relating predicates deSCribing basic structural properties 
of the objects to hJgher level concepts. It must learn the descriptions of the objects "from 
scratch". 
Input to the learning algorithm is the name of the concept to be learned. for instance 
CUP. and examples of that concept. Additional input to the algorithm might be examples of 
objects that are not members of the concept. Sample input examples to an SBL system that is 
to learn the concept CUP are shown in FIgure 5. Structural properties that are the same as 
those used in the preceding section are used to deSCribe the inputs here. The goal of SBL is to 
create a general description of the concept that. so far as 15 possible. includes all the positive 
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examples and excludes all the negative examples. The most obvious algorithm for doing so is 
to compare the input and to find the largest set of descriptive features shared by all of the 
positive examples but not by any of the negative examples. A general description for the CUP 
































Figure 6: General Definition of Cup Found 
bySBL 
The intuition behind the method is that the features essential for defining "CUP-ness" must 
appear in all examples of cups. The features that are not relevant to defining the concept. 
such as color. w1ll vary among the examples and thus not be included in the general 
deSCription. The version of SBL presented here is a simple-minded one. Many SBL systems 
deal with more complex representations. disjunctive definitions. and other generalizations of 
that presented above. 
Though they do not possess the explicit domain theories of EBL systems. SBL programs 
do have an 1mplidt bias built into them that allows them to arrtve at particular general concept 
definitions [Mitchell 80: Utgoff 86). This bias includes. among other things: 
• the language in which input examples and the learned concepts are represented. 
• concept hierarchies that define relationships among the values that can be taken 
on by features. 
Bias built into SBL systems is called inductive bias, because the generalization perfonned by 
such systems is analogous to that of inductive reasoning. or the reasoning from particular 
instances to a general conclusion. 
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The example of similarity-based learning presented here belongs to just one variety of 
the methods called SBL. Although these methods vary. they share the intuition that the 
discovery of commonalities among members of a class may lead to a description for the class 
that will have predictive power in analyzing future examples. Most generally. SBL systems may 
be divided into two categories based upon whether or not examples provided to the system 
have been classified by an external source.4 
Those methods that receive input classified by an external source are termed learning 
from examples. Work in this area includes that of [Mitchell 78; Winston 72) among others. 
These systems may be divided on the basis of the types of examples input. Some are given 
both positive and negative examples of a concept. while others receive only positive examples. 
Another distinction may be made on the basis of whether all examples are seen simultaneously 
or whether a description is built incrementally by considering one example at a time. 
Those methods that receive unclassified input are referred to as conceptual clusterini. 
Typically, many examples of a number of concepts are presented to a conceptual clustering 
system simultaneously. The system creates sets from the input examples such that the 
elements of each set share a number of descriptive features not shared by the members of any 
other set. Work in this area includes that of [Fisher 87; Lebowitz 87; Michalski and Stepp 83). 
As with the overview of explanation-based learning above. this survey does not present a 
formal treatment of similarity-based learning. A summary of the learning from examples style 
of SBL is given in Figure 7. 
INPUT: name of the concept to be learned; 
specific examples (positive and/or negative) 
of the concept. 
OUTPUT: general definition of the concept. 
METHOD: compare examples to find s~larities among positive 
examples and differences of positive examples from 
negative. 
Ftaure 7: Summary of Learning from Examples 
"nus description of SBL has been modilled from a taxonomy of learning methods given in [Machine Learning. 
Volume I 831. 
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2.3 A Comparison of Explanation-Based and Similarity-Based Learning 
Explanation-based and similarity-based learning methods are approaches that can be 
placed on opposite ends of a spectrum describing purely deductive to purely inductive 
techniques [Mitchell 84]. In explanation-based learning. analysis of a single example guides 
the generalization of knowledge possessed by a system in order to make Itself more effiCient. 
Its power derives from having extensive domain lmowledge. The dependence upon the domain 
theory is also the weakness of the method. The theory is assumed to be complete and correct 
and the explanation derivation process to be tractable. These assumptions are unrealistic in 
many complex. real-world domainS. Similarity-based learning systems do not possess the 
extensive. explicit knowledge bases of EBL. They must instead have extensive expliCit example 
bases which gUide them in a search through all possible concepts representable in a given 
language. Problems may arise if the inductive bias is not suffiCiently strong gUiding the search 
or if the Input data is noisy. A more fundamental problem for both learning methods is the 
possibility that the concept to be learned cannot be adequately represented In the language of 
the system. 
A natural solution to the problems of Incomplete, incorrect. and intractable domain 
theories for EBL is to augment such systems with SBL. which works In the absence of a strong 
domain theory. Similarly. the dedUCtive reasoning from an explicit domain theory of EBL may 
be added to SBL systems to prune the search space for interesting similarities or to transform 
one representation language into another. The following sections describe In more detail 
potential problems of EBL and SBL systems. Each section contains case studies of approaches 
that Involve the Integration of explanation-based and similarity-based learning methods to 
address the problems. Examples illustrating each approach are taken from the domain to 
which it has been applied. Some of the methods address multiple deficiencies of EBL and SBL. 
Each of these Is discussed In detail With respect to only one of the problems it addresses. 
3 Using Similarity-Based Learning to Overcome Unrealistic Assumptions 
of Explanation-Based Learning 
3.1 The Problem of Incomplete Theories 
Rajamoney and DeJong [Rajamoney and DeJong 8711dentify two ways in which domain 
theories used by EBL systems can lack lmowledge. In the first. an explanation. or proof. 
cannot be completed by the EBL system because lmowledge, usually in the form of a rule. is 
missing from the domain theory as illustrated in Figure 8. In order to complete the 
explanation. a rule or fact must be added to the domain theory. In the second case. proofs can 
be constructed leading to a conclusIon. but they lack the detail required for a particular 
application. This problem may be seen as one of a wrong chOice of granularity of the 
knowledge represented. Here Rajamoney and DeJong's second deSCription of incompleteness 
is treated as incorrectness of the domain theory. This section discusses four approaches to the 
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problem of missing rules. 
description 
-->A 
of C --::> concept to be learned 
--> B 
input example 
= missing rule to deduce C from A and B. 
Figure 8: The Problem of Incompleteness 
3.1.1 Rajamoney 
Rajamoney [Rajamoney et al. 85: Rajamoney 88: Rajamoney 89) proposes a method 
called experimentation-based theory revision. lmplemented in the ADEPT system. as a 
solution to the problem of incompleteness in a domain theory. Recently. Michalski and Ko 
[Michalski and Ko 88) have also discussed the use of experimentation in addressing this 
problem. The discussion here focusses on Rajamoney's work. 
ADEPTs domain theory is represented using Forbus's Qualitative Process Theory 
[Forbus 84). According to this theory. changes in the world such as boiling or evaporation are 
due to processes. which in reasoning may be used analogously to rules. Processes are 
composed of three parts: 
1. indMduals - a set of objects that participate in the process. 
2. precondItions and quantity conditions - a set of conditions that must be satisfied 
if the process is active. 
3. relations and influences - a set of statements about the world that must be true 
if a process is active. 
PrecondItions and quantity conditions are analogous to the if part of an if-then rule, while 
relations and influences are analogous to the then part. ADEPT's goal is to use processes in 
explaining viewed changes in the world. 
Raj amoney presents three ways in which incompleteness can become evident in a 
domain theory of processes: 
1. an active process. 1.e.. one whose preconditions are satisfied. has flawed 
influences and is, in fact. causing the phenomenon that ADEPT is trying to 
explain. Essentially. this means that the phenomenon should be in the then part 
of an existing active rule (or should be deducible from a chain of active rules). 
but is not. 
2. an inactive process that could explain the phenomenon if active has flawed 
preconditions or quantity conditions and should be active. In other words. a rule 
in which the phenomenon appears in the then part should have fired. but did 
not. Its preconditions. or if part. must be modified so that the rule may become 
active. 
3. a new process is causing the phenomenon. No modification of an existing rule is 
sufficient to complete the explanation. 
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ADEPT proposes new rules when it is unable to complete an explanation for a viewed 
change in the world. The types of rules proposed reflect the first two of the deSCriptions of 
inadequacy Just discussed. That is. an existing active rule can be modified to include the 
viewed change in its then part. or an existing inactive rule can be modified so that its 
preconditions are satisfied. These constrain the number of rules that are proposed. Proposed 
rules are empirically tested for validity. The testing performed by ADEPT is not SBL per se. but 
rather empirical validation. It is included. however. because the underlying premise of SBL is 
empirical validation. That is. SBL makes the assumption that patterns observed over many 
examples will continue to be observed. ADEPT assumes that if the proposed rules accurately 
explain other observed changes in the world then they will continue to apply. 
In order to minimize dependence upon a user. ADEPT tests its proposed rules by 
deSigning experiments so that the results of some of them will be inconsistent with a number 
of the proposed rules. These rules are eliminated from consideration. In an example taken 
from [Michalski and Ko 881. a system is given the task of explaining why a wine bottle placed in 
a freezer shattered. In the absence of more specific information. the system might propose that 
cold causes glass to contract while the volume of the contents of the glass remains the same. 
Alternately the liquid might expand. An experiment could be devised in which a glass 
container of water was placed in a freezer. If the container did not break. the first proposed 
rule would be invalidated. 
Presumably ADEPT must possess a theory of experiment design for the domain to which 
it is applied. Given that good experiment design is a non-trivial problem. such a theory must 
be complex and would therefore be subject to the problem it is supposed to address. that of 
incompleteness. Furthermore. since the experiments would not exhaustively test all 
situations. a rule accepted by the system as appearing to hold in the experimental case mtght 
be incorrect. For instance in the example given above. the container might break despite the 
fact that the proposed rule is wrong. 
A positive aspect of the work is that the number of newly proposed rules Is constrained. 
This is Important because it would be computationally infeaSible to test exponential numbers 




Hall describes a method for learning new rules called Learning by Failing to Explain 
[Hall 86). In this method, a system that fails to find an explanation for an input example is 
given a new, analogous example by a teacher. The system learns by analyzing the analogue 
and comparing its explanation using similarity-based methods to the incomplete explanation. 
Hall's system works in the domain of logic circuit design. Given as input a function 
name and an implementation of that function as a logic circuit, the system's goal is to prove 
that the implementation given is correct. Rules in the domain theory of the system have the 
form LHS => RHS, where LHS denotes a function, such as PWS. and RHS is the deSCription of 
an implementation for the LHS. The RHS may refer to other functions as well as to specific 
circuit implementations. For example. as shown in Figure 9, a function FO might be 
decomposed into three subfunctions Fl. F2. and F3. which might be implemented by circuits 
x. y. and z. respectively. The tree given in the figure is taken to be a proof that the 
implementation is correct. Rules used to construct the proof might be: 
FO => Fl F2 F3 
Fl => x I q I r Is, where I indicates disjunction 
F2 => y 
F3 => z 
FO 
I 
Fl F2 F3 
I 
x y z 
Figure 9: A Proof Tree for Logic Circuits 
In Hall's system an explanation failure arises when the system is unable to prove that an 
input structure implements a given function. In the above example, this would occur if the 
system were missing the rule F I => x I q I r I s as depicted in Figure 10. When the system 
signals a failure, a teacher provides an example from which the system can learn the rule it 
needs. It is assumed that in the failed proof the system is unable to link at most one 
subfunction to structures within the given implementation. That is, at most one rule is 




Fl F2 F3 
I I I 
? y z 
Figure 10: A Failed Proof for Logic 
Circuits 
The teacher gives the system a new input structure that: 
1. implements the same function as that given to the system initially and 
2. contains as a subfuncUon the one for which the proof could not be completed. 
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A teacher-provided analogue to the example given above might be one for which a proof is given 
in Figure 11. The system derives as complete an explanation as possible for the new input. 
Assuming that all rules linking a specific circuit implementation to subfunction Fl are missing. 
a partial proof for the analogue would look like that in Figure 12. Next. corresponding parts of 
the two implementations are matched. where matching is defined as functional equivalence - in 
essence. the proofs are matched. In this example. the system might determine that F2 and F4 
are functionally equivalent. as well as F3 and F5. The system assumes that corresponding 
unmatched parts are equivalent to each other. 1.e.. that they both implement the same 
function. In the example above. a and y match since F2 and F4 are functionally eqUivalent: 
sim1larly. band z match. The yet unmatched parts. q and x. are assumed to both implement 
the unproved function Fl. Rules corresponding to the separate implementations are created 
and generalized. For the example above. the system would learn the rule: Fl ~ x I q. 
FO 
Fl F4 F 
I I I 
q a b 




Fl F4 FS 
? a b 
Figure 12: Partial Proof for 
Teacher-Provided Analogue 
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Hall's system works under the optimistic assumption that its domain theory will be very 
nearly complete. This must be the case if at most one subfunction may be unproved in the 
explanation of an entailing function. Hall's method is dependent upon a user not only for this 
nearly complete theory, but for training examples from which to learn, which must be specially 
tailored to the failure situation. Fortunately the input provided by the teacher does place 
strong constraints on the number of new rules proposed by the system. Recall that in 
Rajamoney's work the number of new rules proposed, although somewhat constrained, could 
be potentially large. 
3.1.3 Pazzani 
Pazzani, in his system OCCAM [pazzant et al. 86: Pazzani 87: pazzant et al. 87: Pazzani 
88). which predicts and explains the outcome of events, uses general knowledge about 
causality to propose cause/effect rules to be added to an incomplete domain theory. Pazzani 
states a clear preference for lmowledge-based methods over empirical ones. He believes that 
EBL Is always to be preferred to SBL and that a system should only fall back on SBL as a last 
resort. In addition to the domain theory used by EBL, he provides OCCAM with a base of 
generalizatlon rules that function as templates for new rules to be created. 
Input to OCCAM is the description of an event. OCCAM's goal is to predict an outcome 
for it. The chain of reasoning from the description of the event to the predicted outcome is a 
proof that the outcome will occur. A failure occurs if a proof cannot be derived that links 
aspects of the event to a predicted result. When this happens, OCCAM instantiates a 
generalization rule that will complete an explanation. Generalization rules encode information 
reflecting a theory of causality, but are otherwise independent of a domain. In theory they 
could be used by a performance system that predIcted the outcome of meteorological events as 
well as by another that predIcted the outcome of chemistry experiments. A typical example of a 
generalization rule is: "If an action on an object precedes a state change for the object, then 
the action may cause the state change." Given two examples, one in which a balloon could not 
be blown up and one in whIch it was first stretched and then blown up, OCCAM would propose 
a rule that stated that stretching a balloon causes it to be in a state from whIch it can be blown 
us 
up. Rules are tentatively proposed by OCCAM as the generalization rules are not guaranteed 
to be inStantiated correctly in all cases. For example, if a balloon were placed in water before 
being blown up, OCCAM would propose a rule that stated that dipping the balloon in water 
caused it to be blown up later. Rules are validated empirically as more examples are seen by 
the system. Thus, at any time, OCCAM's rule base may be incorrect. 
A major strength of OCCAM is that the rules proposed by the system are constrained by 
the base of generalization rules which are applicable across a number of domains. However, 
they are specific to domains involving causality. It is not clear that an analogous base of rule 
templates could be devised for, say, Hall's logic circuit domain. Unlike Hall's system. however, 
Pazzani's is not dependent upon the presence of a teacher. 
3.1.4 Kodratoff and Tecuci 
DISCIPLE [Kodratoff and TecuCi 87; Kodratoff 87) uses an incomplete domain theory to 
pose questions to a user who then teaches the system missing rules. DISCIPLE has been 
applied to the domain of designing technologies for the manufacture of loudspeakers. A typical 
explanation is a plan for the manufacture of a loudspeaker. When the system is unable to 
complete a plan because knowledge is missing from the domain theory, a user supplies a rule 
that will complete the plan. DISCIPLE uses a combination of explanation-based and similarity-
based learning to generalize that rule, thereby making it more widely applicable. 
DISCIPLE beginS the process of rule generalization in explanation-based mode, trying to 
explain why the rule given by the user is valid. Suppose that during the phase of constructing 
a plan, DISCIPLE had needed to A1TACH sectors ON chassfs-mem.brane-assembly. Suppose 
that a user provided the following as a method to achieve that goal: APPLY mowfcoU ON 
sectors, PRESS sectors ON chassfs-membrane-assembly. 5 It is not assumed that the domain 
theory can provide a complete explanation, but only that it contains enough information to 
propose partial explanations. A best partial explanation is selected by the teacher. In the 
example described above, a user selected the explanation labelled A in Figure 13 as the best 
eA-planation proposed by DISCIPLE. Next DISCIPLE enters an SBL phase in order to generalize 
the rule. It searches the domain theory for information that matches the graph edges of the 
explanation selected. For example, the part1al explanation labelled B in Figure 13 was 
extracted from DISCIPLE's domain theory as being Similar to the first partial explanation. 
Before the matching and generalization of SBL can proceed, the user must validate all 
examples as being s1m1lar and relevant in the current context. 
KodratoiI and Tecuci's system relies heavily upon interaction with a teacher, who gives 
the system the information it is missing. Rather than counting on the teacher to provide a 
SFrom [KodratoIT 87), page 271. MowicolL Is roughly translated as Romanian gLue. 
A. 
B. 
/ GLUES --"""'i> sectors 
mowico11 
\\....-- GLUES ---> chassis-membrane-assemb1y 
/ GLUES -----> centering-device 
neoprene 
\\.--- GLUES -----> chassis-assemb1y 
Figure 13: Partial Explanations in 
DISCIPLE 
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general rule, however, it asks for one appropriate for a particular situation and uses 
explanation-based and s1milartty-based techniques to guide the teacher in proViding it with 
infonnation sufficient for generalization of the rule. Constant superVision by the teacher can 
stop DISCIPLE from wasting computational resources considering irrelevant examples and 
assures correctness of the learned rules. This, however, places a heavy burden on the teacher. 
3.1.1S Summary 
This section described four approaches to the problem of finding new rules for an 
incomplete domain theory. KodratotT and Tecuc1 take a conseIVative approach in DISCIPLE. 
which relies heavily on a user both for proposing and verifying new rules. Hall likewise relies 
on a user to input an analogue to a failure situation from which the system can learn. But his 
system is left to analyze the analogue as well as to generate a new rule from it. Both pazzant's 
OCCAM and RaJarnoney's ADEPT are independent of a teacher during the learning process, but 
they rely on the existence of auxiliary theories to gUide them in creating new rules. ADEPT 
needs a theory of experimentation. while OCCAM has one of causality. 
3.2 The Problem of Incorrect Theories 
One manifestation of the incorrect theory problem of explanation-based learning was 
introduced in the previous section on incompleteness. Incorrectness may be the result of 
insufficient detail in the domain theory. This occurs when the designer of the theory makes 
assumptions about knowledge that may be approximated. The use of such a theory may result 
in mutually inconsistent explanations as depicted in Figure 14. A second type of 
incorrectness, probably the more basic one. is that in which wrong knowledge exists in the 
theory and must be retracted. 
The following sections discuss three approaches to the problem of incorrectness. Araya 











Figure 14: The Problem of Incorrectness 
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[Araya 84), in a system that learns in order to solve elementary physics problems. 
considers the task of starting with a domain theory that is incorrect in the sense of encoding 
knowledge at the wrong level of detail. The knowledge is sufficient to generate solution traces, 
or explanations, for all problems, but may not generate solutions that are optimal in the 
number of steps. The system has an auxiliary theory that allows it to simplify a solution trace. 
Simplification here is defined as the elimination of one or more equations employed by the 
general method that are not needed. The learning objective is to find a subclass of problems 
for which the simplified solution holds. 
Using an idea similar to Rajarnoney's, Araya employs an empirical approach in which the 
system tries to determine descriptions of problem classes by performing experiments and 
comparing their results. Variations of the original problem are proposed. A description of a 
problem class in Araya's system is represented In first-order logic. Variations on a problem are 
created by generating false variations of predicates that are true for the original problem 
solved. This is done using background lmowledge associated with each predicate. To 
constrain the number of variations proposed, a fixed priority is used to determine the order in 
which specific kinds of predicates are considered. In the elementary physics domain, the 
priOrity specifies first looking at predicates referring to relations between positions of objects, 
then at predicates referring to relations between attributes of objects. and finally to those 
referring to attributes of objects. 
Next each problem variation is solved. That is, a proof is derived linking the description 
of the problem to the solution. The variation is classified as a positive or negative instance for 
input to SBL. A problem variation is classified as a positive instance if its solution has the 
same extraneous steps as the original solution trace: otherwise it is classified as a negative 
instance. SBL is used to induce a general subclass of problems from the positive and negative 
instances that describes situations in which extraneous problem solving steps can be 
eliminated. 
A number of possible problems exist with the approach proposed by Araya. First, an 
auxiliary theory is needed in order to devise simplified versions of problem solving traces. It Is 
questionable that this auxiliary theory can be assumed to be correct when the main domain 
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theory is not. Second, information must be associated with each possible predicate in order for 
problem variations to be proposed. This requirement places an extra burden on the 
programmer of the system, espeCially when large numbers of predicates exist. The SBL 
component of the system searches for similarities in extraneous steps found in solution traces. 
Although this appears to be generally applicable to all equation solVing domains, not Just that 
of elementary phYSiCS problems, it is not clear that it can be generalized to any other type of 
domain. Finally, the method deSCribed here is very similar to that used in LEX [Mitchell 831.6 
It is not clear that it extends the work beyond the earlier LEX system. 
3.2.2 Silver 
Silver's LP [Silver 88] uses empirical methods to help a performance system work as well 
as possible with potentially incorrect information provided to it by EEL. LP's performance 
domain is mathematical equation solving. The system uses EEL to learn general problem 
solving techniques. Essentially, it develops problem solVing schemata for general classes of 
equations. The system's domain theory is not assumed to be correct. The schemata learned 
will be correctly applicable in many situations, but may occasionally fail. The approach 
devised by Silver to address this problem is to retain the domain theory in its incorrect form, 
but to allow problem solVing experience to override instantiations of the learned schemata. 
The basis of the empirical process is a simple voting system. Votes are updated when LP 
finishes an attempt to solve a new equation. If a schema is successfully used to solve an 
equation, LP increases the future vote for the use of that schema on equations of the same type 
as that one Just seen. If a schema IS used unsuccessfully, Le., if it is applied but does not lead 
LP to a solution, LP decreases the vote. Such a mechanism allows LP to eventually stop 
applying learned schemata to Situations in which they probably will not work. 
The other approaches to solving the incorrect theory problem discussed here involve 
using auxiliary knowledge to detect problems and to correct the theory. Silver takes a more 
optimistic approach to the problem. As he assumes that the theory will in most cases be 
correct, it might not be worthwhile to expend computational resources to change it. Instead, a 
simple empirical technique lowers the credibility of learned schemata if they are found to fail in 
Situations where the theory implies that they should be applicable. If a schema fails a 
sutTicient number of Urnes, it will be conSidered unusable and will, therefore, be essentially 
unlearned. 
Although the simplicity of Silver's approach is appealing, it carmot be applied effiCiently 
with domain theories that are not largely correct. It is not deSirable to have to unlearn most of 
the schemata proposed by EEL, especially since Silver assumes that LP has a default 
mechanism for solving all equations seen anyway. Although schemata are learned to save LP 
6LEX is dIscussed In more detail In Section 4.1.3. 
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problem solving time, they might be better ignored entirely if they don't generally work. 
3.2.3 Dietterich and Flann 
Diettertch and Flann [Diettertch and Flann 88] identify a method, called Induction Over 
Explanations (IOE) , that allows incorrect knowledge to be removed from a system's domain 
theory. IOE requires that several tra1n.1ng examples be provided to a system by a teacher. For 
each training example, the domain theory is used to construct all pOSSible explanations. The 
dertved explanations are input to SBL. For example. conSider the domain of medical diagnosis 
in which a system is asked to detennlne what causes lung cancer. A tra1n.1ng example might 
be a patient with lung cancer. including infoIIDation about that person's general health and 
substances to which their lungs have been exposed -- such as the scent of flowers. The system 
creates all explanations linking potential causes to the patient's having cancer. Some of these 
explanations may be incorrect, say in the case that the domain theory states that smelling 
flowers causes lung cancer. 
When all explanations have been dertved, IOE prunes the domain theory such that at 
least one explanation exists for every positive example and no explanation may be dertved for a 
negative example. In the case of the lung cancer examples, the system should not be able to 
conclude that a healthy person has cancer. This is accomplished by comparing explanations. 
Rules from the domain theory that are found in explanations of positive examples are retained. 
Rules shared by the explanations of negative examples but not found in the positive are deleted 
from the theory. When rules required to prove the negative instances have been deleted, the 
negative cases can no longer be proved. 
Flann and Diettertch's IOE approach is commendable in that it attempts to make 
changes to a domain theory. A number of potential problems exist with the method of IOE, 
however. It requires that all explanations for a given input example be generated. It may be 
the case, in practice, that the number of explanations is small. yet this is not necessarily true 
for all domains. Furthermore, the matching of explanations is not a straightforward process 
and could prove to be computationally prohibitive. 
Although Diettertch and Flann discuss the use of both positive and negative examples, 
their current implementation of IOE learns from positive examples only. It is possible, given 
that the algortthm requires only that one explanation hold for each input example, that correct 
rules will be elim.tnated from the domain theory. For example. consider a case in which ten 
examples are input to IOE. Say that all are examples of patients with lung cancer and that all 
patients have been exposed to cigarette smoke. Also assume that one of these patients was 
additionally exposed to toxiC fumes. Rules rrught exist in the domain theory that would 
descrtbe both cigarette smoke and toxic fumes as potential causes of lung cancer. Since only 
enough rules need to be retained to explain the input in one way, the rule specifying cigarette 
smoking might be kept while that referring to toxic fumes might be eliminated. This would 
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clearly be incorrect. If negative examples were seen in whIch the rule about tOXic fumes did 
not playa role. the system could more accurately assume that its existence in only a single 
positive example was not problematic. Alternatively. the system could wait for more examples. 
presumably encountering one in which there was no reference to cigarette smoke but only a 
reference to toxic fumes. 
3.2.4 Summary 
This section described three approaches to the problem of detecting and compensating 
for incorrectness in a domain theory. Araya and Silver conSider working with a domain theory 
that has been encoded at the wrong level of granularity. Araya uses an auxiliary theory to 
convert an explanation (or problem trace. in his case) into a more effiCient version. He then 
uses empirical methods to find cases to which the simplifications can be applied more 
generally. Silver conjectures that if general schemata formed by EBL are rarely incorrect then 
the theory that generated them need not be corrected. The schemata can simply be ignored (or 
unlearned) if they are not found to work well. 
Dietterich and Flann consider the problem of using a theory that contains incorrect 
information. They remove the incorrect information. or rules. by treating them as features in 
an inductive learning problem. 
3.3 The Problem of Intractable Theories 
A problem arises in explanation-based learning when the deductions that the system 
might make are computationally prohibitive and cannot be completed [Mitchell et al. 86]. 
While constructing an explanation the system exceeds the resources (time. memory. etc.) 
allotted to it. This is called the problem of intractability of the domain theory. 
The knowledge represented in the domain theory of an EBL system may be viewed as a 
collection of if-then rules. The process of constructing the proof that the input example is a 
member of the concept to be learned Is one of chaining together these rules such that the 
description of the example is linked to the concept. Given this. two different kinds of 
intractability can be encountered [Rajamoney and DeJong 87]: 
• Large Search Space Problem - This occurs when the number of rules in the 
domain theory that appear to be relevant in deriVing a proof is large. Finding the 
appropriate subset of rules that actually link the input example to the concept 
might inVOlve exploring paths that appear promising but that do not lead to the 
creation of a proof. If explanation generation 15 viewed as search. then in the 
worst case the size of the space explored is DB. where D is the maximum length of 
an explanation and B is the maximum number of rules applicable at any point. 
The large search space problem occurs when DB is large. and is characterized by 
large values for B. 
• Small Links Problem - This occurs when the number of rules required to form a 
single proof is too many for the system to construct the complete proof within the 
allotted resources. This problem is independent of the large search space problem 
and may occur even when no search is involved. Viewing explanation generation 
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as search. it is characterized by large values of D. 
This section describes three approaches to distinct types of intractability. Lebowitz 
addresses the large search space problem. Ellman additionally considers the problem of small 
links. UtgotT and Saxena focus on the effiCient use of definitions learned by EBL. This type of 
intractabU1ty will be described in more detail in the discussion of their work. 
3.3.1 Lebowitz 
In a variation of his system UNIMEM (Lebowitz 86al. Lebowitz uses SBL as a front-end to 
an explanation-based learning system to address the large search space problem defined 
above. Rather than generating an explanation for every instance input to the system. UNIMEM 
first applies a conceptual clustering style of similarity-based learning to input examples. which 
are represented as sets of features. essentially property/value pairs. The input examples are 
placed by the SBL algorithm into groups such that the members of each group share a subset 
of descriptive features. The shared features form a general definition for each group. When 
SBL has been completed. EBL is applied to the generalizations that have been formed. 
One reason for first applying sim1larity-based learning methods is that by looking for 
similarities. a system is able to bring some regularity to a domain for which there does not 
exist a complete theory. More significantly. Lebowitz pOints out that s1m11arities between 
examples often occur because of some underlying causal mechanism. To express this. he 
defines a notion called predictability. Features that occur in fewer generalizations are said to 
be predictive because they are most likely to be causes in a causal description, or proof. In 
[Lebowitz 86b] he explains this by POinting out that a feature present in many different 
generalizations cannot by itself imply the existence of a feature that occurs in only one of those 
generalizations. or it would imply its existence in all the other generalizations. He gives the 
following example from the domain of meteorology. If SBL has created many generalizatlons 
that have as a feature DROUGHT. but only one of these has the feature WARM:-CURRENTS. 
then the presence of DROUGHT cannot imply the presence of WARM-CURRENTS or that 
feature would be present in all the generalizations containing the DROUGHT feature. It is 
possIble. though not guaranteed. that the presence of WARM-CURRENTS implies the presence 
of DROUGHT. The presence of WARM-CURRENTS in only the single generalization makes it a 
predictive feature. In traditional EBL. a proof is derived to show that features of the input 
example imply membership in a concept to be learned. In UNIMEM. a proof is derived to show 
that predictive features imply the existence of non-predictive features. From there EBL 
proceeds normally. 
By using an SBL component that first classifies and generalizes input examples. 
UNIMEM attacks the problem of intractable domains in two ways: 
1. Rather than expla1n1ng all input instances. only generalizations are explained. 
resulting in fewer explanations to be derived. 
2. Predictability can be used to choose relevant features to appear in an 
explanation. A large part of the rule space used in deIiving an explanation can 
be pruned in the search for the causal description. 
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Lebowitz's approach to the problem of intractability constrasts in interesting ways with 
Ellman·s. described next. Further discussion of UNIMEM is therefore deferred until Ellman's 
work has been discussed. 
3.3.2 Ellman 
Ellman. in his program POLLYANA [Ellman 87; Ellman 88a; Ellman 88bl. approaches 
the problem of intractability not by pruning the search space for explanations, as Lebowitz 
does, but by replacing the intractable theory by an apprOximate theory requiring fewer 
computational resources. The intractable theory is apprOximated by adding simplifying 
assumptions that, although not true in all situations, will be correct in most cases. 
The domain to which POLLYANA has been applied is the card game "hearts". An 
explanation is the computation of an evaluation function yielding the expected fmal game score 
for a player who plays a certain card chOice. That Is. a proof is generated that the particular 
card chOice would lead to the computed final game score. While this could be accomplished by 
performing a complete minimax search. the process would be intractable. 
POLLYANA begins Its search for simplifying assumptions in the hearts domain by 
generating a set of candidate assumptions. It does so by instantiating schemata from a set of 
predefined generic Simplifying assumptions. The system then selects sets of candidate 
assumptions and integrates them into the initial intractable theory. This produces a collection 
of apprOximate theories, organized in a lattice-structured search space. In POLLYANA, 
functions used to evaluate the expected score are defined in multiple ways. each version 
implementing a different simplifying assumption. Representing assumptions in thls way allows 
the system to easily determine when a set of assumptions is complete. that Is, when there is a 
definition for each function. Finally. the system conducts an empirical search through the 
approximate theory space in order to select one of the approximate theories. 
Input to POLLYANA is a set of examples where each input instance is a card cholce for a 
given player in a certain trick. For each example. POLLYANA evaluates the expected final game 
score with an approximate theory. beginning with the simplest of the approximate theories. As 
discussed above, evaluation is analogous to the proof derivation process. If the scores 
evaluated meet a pre-specified error threshold. then POLLYANA adopts the approximate theory. 
If not. the procedure is repeated with the most simple of the remaining approximate theories. 
Given one set of training examples POLLYANA was led to a theory that ignored the probability 
of w1nn!ng the current trick while concentrating on the trick's expected point value. By 
introducing Simplified versions of evaluation functions in POLLYANA, it becomes unnecessary 
to fully expand minimax game trees. or even subtrees. in order to do evaluation. Thus the 
method applies to both the large search space and small links problems. 
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Both Ellman and Lebowitz integrate explanation-based and empirtcallea.rning methods 
in an effort to overcome the intractable theory problem in explanation-based learning. A major 
advantage of Ellman's approach is that it considers both the large search space and smalllin.ks 
problems, whereas Lebowitz looks only at the large search space problem. 
Ellman's method is not without its shortcomings, however. It requires a great deal of 
knowledge beyond that needed for EBL alone. For example, it requires a typology of generic 
simplifying assumptions. Ellman lists a number of these that are intended to be generally 
applicable to situations in which the explanation or proof is an evaluation of a function. For 
instance, in order to Simplify an evaluation function, one can assume independence of random 
variables. That is, Prob(x given y) = Prob(x). It is not clear, however, that such a typology can 
be specified for cases where the explanation is a more general proof that an example is an 
instance of a particular concept. Even if this were possible and one could create abstract rules 
corresponding to apprOximate functions, the system would still have to be provided with a 
relation partially ordering the approximations. Another potential problem of Ellman's method 
is that it introduces incorrectness into a correct domain theory. If the extent of intractability of 
the domain theory were such that it was not usable for any input example. it could reasonably 
be argued that the ability to process examples outweighed any inaccuracy introduced, 
However, this is clearly an extreme case. At the other extreme one could imagine a theory that 
was tractable for all but a few input examples. It might not be worthwhUe to gain explanatory 
power for a few examples at the expense of sacrifiCing correctness for the majority of cases. 
In contrast to Ellman's approach, Lebowitz's does not require that the system have any 
knowledge beyond that necessary for EBL in general. Unfortunately. there are problems with 
the notion of predictabUity [Lebowitz 86b). In the meteorology example presented above, 
UNIMEM would attempt to prove that the presence of the predictive feature, WARM-
CURRENTS, implied the presence of DROUGHT. It would be possible. however. that in fact the 
presence of DROUGHT in conjunction with some other predictive feature (or even a non-
predictive one) implied the presence of WARM-CURRENTS. This may be called a problem of 
conjunctive predictabilUy. Considering what appear to be non-predictive features in 
conjunction with each predictive feature may cause new intractability problems. Not doing so 
may result in missing explanations. 
Finally. Lebowitz and Ellman's approaches can be compared on the basis of their 
independence from a teacher. In POLLYANA, Ellman's system, teacher-prepared examples are 
input to the system. UNIMEM can operate without a teacher. 
Lebowitz and Ellman approach the intractable domain problem from two very different 
perspectives. Lebowitz uses generalizations to restrict the search for explanations. Ellman 
introduces new knowledge that allows a system to fmd an approximate but tractable theory. 
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3.3.3 Utgoff and Saxena 
Utgoff and Saxena [Utgoff and Saxena 88] consider the problem of intractability In a 
slightly different sense from Lebowitz and Ellman. They assume that the actual derivation of 
an explanation is not expensive but that evaluating whether a new Instance is covered by an 
explanation is. Although intended to derive general definitions that are effidently matched. 
EBL sometimes produces definitions that are. In fact. inefficIent to use. Consider an EBL 
system that is given as input a graph and a path that is the shortest between two particular 
nodes of the graph. Finding other graphs that would match the general class for which the 
path was shortest would involve a solution of the (subJ-graph isomorphism problem. which is 
l'\P-complete. (A variant of this is discussed in [Tambe and Newell 88). Further discussion on 
the problem of efficiency in using definitions derived by EBL may be found in [MInton 88)). 
Utgoff and Saxena essentially apply EBL and SBL in parallel until it is determined that 
sufficient confidence can be placed in a given definition inferred by SBL. Utgoff and Saxena's 
learning mechanism is embedded in a larger problem solving system that uses a domain theory 
and a successfully solved problem to infer a set of prioritized subgoals. A subgoalis defined by 
a predicate that deSCribes the set of states that satisfy it. Within the predicate is a deCision 
procedure that manages two definitions of the concept: a. presumably inefficient to match. 
definition learned by EBL. and a. presumably effiCient. definition learned by SBL. For a given 
subgoal predicate. an argument is to be classified as a positive instance if it satisfies the 
subgoal. and a negative instance if it does not. The problem state is first classified according to 
the fast definition. If the fast definition determines the answer with high probability. then it is 
returned. Otherwise. the argument is classified according to the slow definition. Classification 
according to the slow definition tells the system whether it is a positive or negative instance of 
the concept for incrementally updating the fast definition using SBL. As the fast definition 
becomes more reliable. the slow definition is used less often. 
Utgoff and Saxena's approach is simple and apparently applicable across domains. It 
uses EEL to classify inputs as positive or negative rather than relying on an outside source for 
that information. However. is seems to carry With it some of the weaknesses of both 
explanation-based and s1milarity-based learning. The use of definitions produced by EEL 
requires a complete and correct domain theory; it is assumed that the theory is not intractable 
in either of the senses described at the beg1nn.1ng of this section. Furthermore. UtgofI and 
Saxena's system peIforms pure SBL. causing it to suffer from the shortCOmings discussed in 
Section 4. Finally. it is not clear how their method determines that the concept defInition 
learned by SBL is "good enough" to allow the slow but correct definition to be abandoned. 
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3.3.4 Summary 
This section discussed approaches to three types of intractability. Lebowitz uses 
predictability information extracted from SBL to prune the space of rules that need to be 
considered in deriving an explanation. Ellman addresses the small links problem by using 
empirical methods to select assumptions that simplify a theory by remOVing detail. Utgoff and 
Saxena use EBL only until a fast definition learned by SBL is considered accurate. 
4 Using Explanation-Based Learning to Adjust the Biases of 
Similarity-Based Learning 
4.1 The Problem of Representational Inadequacy 
The entities that can be described by the input and output for a learning system are 
determined by their knowledge representation. Thus the chOice of a particular representation 
language is said to bias SBL in that it constrains the concepts output from - and therefore 
learned by - the method. 
Preferably the creator of a learning system should not be required to anticipate all input 
that the system will encounter in a given domain. If that were necessary. learning systems 
would be limited to functioning in small. non-complex domains. Furthermore. it is desirable 
that a given learning system be applicable across a wide range of domains. But often a 
representation sutted to one domain does not adequately capture the objects in another. If the 
burden of anticipating all future processing of a learning system is to be removed from the 
initial design. a learning system must be able to modify. or at least add to. Its body of 
representable objects. 
This section deSCribes three approaches to modifying knowledge representations for SBL. 
The first two address the issue of modJ..fy1ng a representation in order to use the best for a 
particular context. The third addresses the problem of learning new vocabularies. 
4.1.1 Flann and Dietterich 
Flann and Dietlertch's SBL system Wyl [Flann and Dietlerich 86J pays special attention 
to the issue of the appropriateness of a knowledge representation. Illustrating their pOints with 
examples from the game of checkers. Flann and Dietterich point out that entities similar in one 
way are often very different in another. For example. many different board configurations 
might correspond to the concept trap. Difficulties can arise when the representation of a 
concept required for the performance task of a system is not a natural representation for 
learning that concept. In the checkers domain. an appropriate representation for the task of 
playing the game is a board configuration. However. providing an SBL system only with 
examples of board configurations in order to have it learn the concept trap would not be 
satisfactory as static board configurations do not capture the essence of a trap situation. 
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In order to handle this problem, Flann and Dietterich designed Wyl to accept training 
instances in a perJonnance representation that is explicitly converted into a learning 
representation for SBL. The learned definition is then mapped back into the performance 
representation. In the game of checkers, for example, input to Wyl is in the form of board 
configurations, which are translated into functional descriptions for SBL. Conversion from one 
representation to the other is a proof process in the sense of the explanation construction of 
EBL. The generalization step of EBL is not performed. The translation of one representation 
into another more useful to a system is termed operationalization [Mostow 81]. 
Wyl is similar to Buchanan and Mitchell's earlier Meta-DENDRAL [Buchanan and 
Mitchell 78]. In Meta-DENDRAL training instances were presented in a structural 
representation consisting of molecular structures and associated mass spectra. These were 
translated into a learning representation of behavioral descriptions called cleavage processes, 
sequences of cleavage steps. The cleavage steps were then inductively generalized to obtain 
general cleavage rules. 7. 
Flann and Dietterich's work is an important first step in addressing the problem of the 
inadequacy of fixed representations. They point out that the chOice of a best representation 
might differ, not only across domains, but within a single domain in different contexts. The 
ability of a learning system to translate the representation of the performance system in which 
the learner is embedded to improve the learning process is desirable. The method of 
translating between representations is generally applicable, but it is not clear that it can be 
realistically implemented short of deviSing a separate translation procedure for every different 
pair of representations. The method does not remove the burden of choosing an appropriate 
representation from the programmer. The creator of the system is required to choose the 
representation into which all input is to be translated. 
4.1.2 Stepp and Michalski 
Stepp and Michalski [Stepp and Michalski 86] address an issue similar to that looked at 
by Flann and Dietterich. They conSider the use of different representations of identical obj ects 
for different contexts. More specifically, Stepp and Michalski point out that a set of objects 
might be classified in a number of ways depending upon the performance task for which the 
classifications are being used. Thus they conSider different contexts to be defined by different 
perfonnance tasks. while Flann and Dletterich focus on a difference in context between 
performance and learning. 
In Stepp and Michalski's work a single feature set might be adequate to deScribe all 
objects in a domain, but different subsets of those features could be more or less important for 
different tasks. ConSider the domain of classifying objects on a restaurant table. Features for 
7This Is taken from the clear descrtption of Meta-DENDRAL given in [Flann and Diettertch 861 
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this domain might include the material out of which an object is made - such as ceramic for 
dishes and crystal for glasses. If an object were a container. another feature might be Its 
contents. Say one wanted a system to classify a crystal salt shaker. It would be reasonable to 
classify it together with the crystal glasses as they share the feature describing the material out 
of which they are made. It would also be reasonable to classify it with food as the salt shaker 
contains a seasoning. One or the other classification would be better in the context of a 
particular performance task - say creating attractive table settings as opposed to making 
seasoned foods. 
Features deemed relevant in a particular situation might furthermore be described most 
informatively by a new feature name that deSCribes the property they define. For example. 
rather than deSCribing salt using a feature giving its type as a seasoning and describing lettuce 
as being of type vegetable. one might want to create a new feature that would describe both as 
being edible. The process of creating new. more appropriately descriptive features is termed 
constructive induction [Michalski 83). In order to create general definitions of objects using 
the conceptual clustering variation of SBL. constructive induction Is first performed on the 
objects. The process beginS by selecting the set of features important to the context. This 
requires a theory that encodes relevance information. Then using another theory. the system 
chains forward from the relevant features to arrive at new. more descriptive predicates. 
Conceptual clustering is performed on the newly constructed features. 
Stepp and Michalski's method of constructive induction proVides for the use of the most 
descriptive features in a given context. Aside from making the learned concepts more 
understandable to a human observer. their method avoids problems that might arise if a 
system were to place significance on coincidental similarities. The method does not allow 
similarities among irrelevant features to be discovered because it possesses a theory that 
defines the set of relevant features for any learning context. Features not included in this set 
need not be considered. 
Michalski [:v1ichalski 87). has recently extended his earlier work with Stepp. In this work 
he notes that learned representations of concepts are inflexible in the boundaries they define 
for entities that are contained within them. while most concepts in the real world have 
imprecIse meanings. His approach to learning such imprecise concept definitions is based 
upon the idea of a two-tiered concept representation. The meaning of a concept is defined by 
two components: the base concept representation (BCR) and the inferential concept 
interpretation (lCI). The BCR is learned by SBL and may include representative examples and 
counter-examples of the concept in addition to the general description. The leI applies a 
deductive. I.e .. explanatory. process using domain knowledge that represents such information 
as the importance of concept attributes and the context of discourse. Thus an EBL-like 
component Is appended to what is otherwise an SBL system. Preliminary work on this learning 
mechanism has been applied by Michalski to the domain of lymphography. 
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Watanabe and Ello [Watanabe and Elio 87) consider constructive induction in the 
context of incremental inductive learning, 1.e., in a situation in which not all examples are 
presented to the learning mechanism at once. Their system, LAIR. has been applied to the 
problem of learning the definition of a cup. 
4.1.3 Utgoff 
Vtgoff, With STABB [Vtgoff 86], addresses a more fundamental issue in representational 
inadequacy than those discussed above. In many SBL systems, general names are defined to 
describe subsets of the values that a particular feature might take. However, these names 
might not fully describe every learning Situation that a system might encounter. For example, 
in the LEX system that solves problems in the domain of integral calculus [Mitchell 83], there 
is encoded in the system that sin, cos, tan, sec, csc, and cot are trigonometric functions. In 
creating a general concept description for which examples had specific trigonometric functions 
as values of a particular feature. LEX might generalize the value of the feature to be "any 
trigonometric function". A problem would arise if. say, the values appearing for a single 
feature in all examples were either sin or cos, and the system had no way to describe this 
subset of the trigonometric functions. The system would have to choose between making the 
generalization to "any trigonometric function" and representing the disjunction of these values 
explicitly. Making the generalization results in a more succinct representation of the feature. 
On the other hand. it might be incorrect. More formally, a problem exists because the 
hypothesis space of concept deSCriptions does not include a succinct defmition that is 
consistent with the training instances. 
STABB is an extension to LEX: thus its domain of application is integration. The process 
of integration may be viewed as the transformation of an equation containing an integral sign 
into one that does not include the integral sign. Each legal rule of transformation is an 
operator. The learning goal is to create a general description for a class of equations to which 
the application of a particular operator leads to a solved integral. Input to STABB includes an 
operator and an example of a full solution trace in which the application of the particular 
operator was useful. STABB uses constraint propagation to identifY new concepts that should 
be represented in the description language. This is a mechanism that can be used to 
generalize a proof in EBL. If constraint propagation fails, STABB falls back on using the least 
disjunction of the values observed in multiple training instances. Thus, in order to identifY 
new general values to be described in the representation language, STABB uses a solution 
trace, or explanation, and constraint propagation, which together are the mechanisms of EBL. 
Vtgoff considers a basic issue in representational inadequacy, that of constructing new 
terms that do not yet exist in the concept language. Although such a mechanism is necessary 
for autonomous learning, it is not clear that his technique is the appropriate method to use. It 
is based almost exactly upon an explanation-based learning algorithm and thus Will have 
associated With it the problems caused by unrealistic assumptions about the domain theory. 
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The one example of a learned term shown by UtgofI is that describing odd numbers. It is not 
clear how extensible the method is. 
4.1.4 Summary 
This section desCribed three approaches to the problem of representational inadequacy. 
Flann and Dietterich use deduction to transfonn one representation into another that is better 
suited for a particular context. Stepp and Michalski use a similar approach. UtgofI applies 
EBL for learning new terms that better describe generalizations of feature values. 
4.2 The Problem of Searching a Large Hypothesis Space 
Similarity-based learning may be viewed as search through the hypothesis space of 
representable concepts for one that is consistent with all positive input examples and 
inconsistent with negative input examples. The hypothesis space is potentially huge. A 
problem to be addressed is how search may be directed to prune large parts of the hypothesis 
space. 
[Mitchell 84) was among the first to propose that explanation-based learning be used to 
focus the attention of SBL. enabling it to make larger leaps through its hypothesis space of 
concept definitions. Mitchell's proposed solution is an extension of the version space algorithm 
[Mitchell 78) for SBL. A version space is a lattice of representable concepts. Representations 
of specific instances are at one end of the lattice. while the most general concept definition. of 
which all entities are members. is at the other end. The version space algorithm maintains two 
sets of concepts. One set. S. contains the most specific concept definitions consistent with all 
the positive examples seen by the system. The other. G. contains the most general definitions 
not inconsistent with any of the negative examples seen. The algorithm learns incrementally. 
1.e .. concept definitions are modified after seeing each input. Positive input examples may 
cause the S set to be modified by making its members more general. Negative input examples 
cause the G set to be modified. making it more specific so as to exclude the negative examples. 
S and G sets are pictured in Figure 15. After seeing enough input. the Sand G sets should 
grow toward each other and become equivalent. This is the learned concept definition. 
Mitchell suggested that performing EBL on each positive input example provides a set of 
suffiCient conditions for being an instance of the concept to be learned. This set of sufficient 
conditions provides a basis for refining the S set of the version space. Negative instances are 
still used to refine the G set. This has recently been implemented by HirSh [Hirsh 89). 
A number of researchers have more recently investigated the idea of using EBL to 
provide extra information to SBL in order that it might intelligently prune its search space. 
The following sections present the approaches of Salzberg. Swaminathan. Danyluk. and Van 
Lehn. 
4.2.1 Salzberg 
concept definition whose 








Figure 15: Boundary Sets of the Version Space 
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Salzberg. with HANDICAPPER [Salzberg 83; Salzberg 851. derives explanations to identify 
potentially important features for revising the defInition of a concept. HANDICAPPER's domain 
of application is horse racing. where its perfonnance task is to predict the horse that w11l win a 
race. The learning task is to identify sets of features that define the concepts "winning horse" 
and "losing horse". Input to HANDICAPPER are feature sets describing the horses in a race. 
HA.J."'ll)ICAPPER chooses a winner by selecting the horse with features most similar to those 
describing a Winner in general. If the prediction is incorrect. then the concept definitiOns for 
winning and losing horses are modified. 
To modify the feature sets defining the two concepts. HANDICAPPER perfonns SBL. 
looking for differences between the horse predicted to win and the horse that actually won. 
This provides the system with a choice of features to be modified in the concept definitions for 
winning and losing horses respectively. Next explanations are derived that enable the system 
to identify those features most likely to require modification. In HANDICAPPER explanations 
relate features of a single horse to each other. The domain knowledge contains rules linking 
the presence of certain features to others. Concentrating on those features found to be 
different in the SBL phase. the EBL phase looks for those that contradict rules in the domain 
knowledge. No generaliZation of the explanation is done. The features identified by the EBL 
phase are modified in the concept description. 
Salzberg's approach is s1m1lar to those taken by Swaminathan and Danyluk. Further 
discussion of his method is therefore deferred until theirs have been introduced. 
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4.2.2 Swaminathan 
SWaminathan. whose system has been applied to the domain of epidemiology 
[Swaminathan 881. uses similarity-based learning to identify a set of features common to the 
victims of an illness in a manner similar to Salzberg's for horse raCing. Because the feature set 
deSCribing victims of an illness can potentially be huge. Swaminathan uses EBL to identify a 
set of features on which to focus. The domain theory used by the explanation-based 
component of Swaminathan's system 18 a partial causal theory of disease. The parts of the 
domain theory that are missing are those that refer to specific values of features describing 
input examples. For instance. given a set of hepatitis victims for which the system needs to 
find the cause of the illness. the domain theory would contain general information about 
contaminated water sources possibly causing hepatitis. It would not contain more specific 
information stating what water sources were contaminated. Explanations are generated using 
the partial theory linking general features of the input examples to the illness. As an 
explanation does not refer to specific feature values. it is not a proof that those features 
referred to are actual causes. It is a proof that those features are possible causes. SBL 
concentrates on these. presumably relevant. attributes of the inputs. 
4.2.3 Danyluk 
Danyluk. in Gemini. uses explanations in three distinct ways to aid in conceptual 
clustering [Danyluk 87: Danyluk 881. All three follow from deriving an explanation of each 
input example before performing similarity-based learning. Gemini has been applied to the 
domains of network fault diagnosis. radio fault diagnosis. and terrOrist event news stories. 
The first way that explanations are used in Gemini to focus SBL is similar to the 
approaches of Salzberg and Swaminathan described above. Features used in the explanation 
of an input example are deemed to be most relevant. Features considered to be less relevant 
are not discarded. but are not conSidered to be important in the definition of a concept and 
thus are not generalized by SBL. Second. explanations provide a context for generalization of 
feature values. Unlike earlier SBL systems. Gemini is not biased to choose a single 
generalization for each subset of possible feature values. Multiple chOices exist. one of which 
will be more or less appropriate in different contexts. Context is encoded in the domain 
knowledge used by EBL. Finally. explanations are used as a filter to safeguard against 
classifying an entity as a member of a particular concept if it agrees with that concept 
definition only in the syntactiC similarity of its feature values. Explanation structures of input 
obJ ects must at least partially match if they are to be included as members of the same 
concept. 
Danyluk. Salzberg. and Swaminathan all use explanations to focus on a subset of 
features for matching and generalization in SBL. Also falling into the class of methods that use 
dedUCtion to focus on feature subsets is constructive induction. discussed earlier in Section 
4.1.2. None of these expliCitly requires that the domain theory with which it works be 
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complete, yet each essentially treats it as if it were. This clearly can be problematic. In the 
cases of Salzberg and Swaminathan, as well as in constructive induction, features not 
identified by an explanation as important are not even considered by SBL. Danyluk looks at 
features not appearing in an explanation, but places strtngent requirements on the ways in 
which they can be generalized. Danyluk further requires that auxiliary context knowledge be 
explicitly provided to SBL for better generalizations, an extra burden for the system deSigner. 
4,2,4 Van Lehn 
In Van Lehn's SIERRA system [Van Lehn 871, guidance as to the relative importance of 
features and the way in which to generalize them using SBL is provided by a teacher. Certain 
conventions, or felicity conditions, are understood by both the similarity-based learning 
system and the teacher. For example, in SIERRA's performance domain, arithmetic 
procedures, it is understood that the teacher will introduce at most one new disjunct to a 
concept per lesson. This drastically cuts the hypothesis space to be searched by SIERRA in 
performing inductive inference. Because of its dependence upon a teacher and feliCity 
conditions between the teacher and learning mechanism, this work is of a somewhat different 
nature than the systems above. However, it is included here because of an explanatory step 
that SIERRA performs before doing induction. Upon receiving an input example in the form of 
a sequence of actions that solve an arithmetic problem, SIERRA attempts to parse the action 
sequence. The parse tree constitutes an explanation for the action sequence. The inability to 
complete a parse indicates the new disjunct, in SIERRA's case a subprocedure, to be learned. 
Due to the nature of the learned disjunct - 1.e., that it is a new arithmetic rule - this may also 
be viewed as a use of induction for the incomplete theory problem of EBL. 
4,2,5 Summary 
This section discussed three basic approaches to cutting the search of SBL. Mitchell 
proposed that a positive example generalized by EBL be input to the version space algorithm. 
The single generalized example is essentially equivalent to a set of ungeneralized positive 
examples. Salzberg, Swaminath an , and Danyluk use explanations to focus the attention of 
SBL on features that are presumably most relevant. Van Lehn relies on felicity conditions 
between a teacher and learning system in order to focus incremental inductive learning. 
Although the above methods gUide the search, an extra cost Is incurred by generating the 
explanations that provide the focus for SBL. 
5 Related Work in the Integration of Deduction and Induction 
Other work in machine learning might be viewed as integrating inductive, or similarIty-
based, and deducttve, or explanation-based, mechanisms. A number of researchers have 
investigated the use of analogy as a learning mechanism. Analogy, the inference that if two or 
more things agree in some respects they will probably agree in others, involves the matching of 
one entity with another. Thus the matching techniques of SBL are often applied here. 
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Furthermore. since similarities might be found at a different level from the purely superficial 
one of entities' observable characteristics. the entities are often analyzed using deductive. or 
explanation-based. mechanisms as well. Examples of work in analogy include [Burstein 86; 
Carbonell 83a: Carbonell 83b; Kedar-Cabelli 85; Russell 86]. 
Exemplar-based learning is another mechanism that combines inductive and deductive 
techniques. In exemplar-based learning a concept is represented by a stereotypical example. 
DedUCtion. or explanation derivation. is used to detennlne whether an input might be an 
instance of the concept even if it does not exactly match the definition of the exemplar for the 
class. An example of work in this area is [Bareiss and Porter 87]. More generally. work has 
been done in Case-Based Reasoning (CBR). The philosophy of CBR is that solutions to 
problems need not always be derived from scratch. A new problem solving situation might be 
similar to one encountered earlier. It might be useful to modify the solutlon to the old problem. 
In CBR cases of previously seen problems and their solutions are stored in memory. When a 
new problem arises an old case is retrieved. Mechanisms similar to those desCribed above for 
analogy may be used to retrieve appropriate cases for modification. Work in CBR includes 
[Hammond 88; Kolodner 87]. 
Finally. work in expert systems knowledge acquisition is not discussed here due to the 
fact that. although the lack of necessary knowledge is often detected by expert systems. it is 
generally then provided directly by an outside user. Although deductive mechanisms are often 
used by expert systems. they are most often used as mechanisms for reasoning and problem 
solving. and not directly for knowledge acquisition purposes. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has surveyed machine learning systems that integrate explanation-based and 
similarity-based learning. EBL is an analytical approach that has as a major goal the re-
structuring of an explicit domain theory to improve performance effiCiency. SBL has the goal of 
acquiring concept definitions not yet known to a system. It does not require the use of an 
explicit domain theory as does EBL. Both methods have been applied with some success to a 
variety of domains. However. the two techniques make assumptions that are not guaranteed 
to hold. In EBL it is assumed that the explicJt domain theory 1s complete. correct. and 
tractable; in SBL it is assumed that the knowledge representation is adequate to deSCribe the 
concepts to be learned and that the process of searchlng for the appropriate concept definition 
1s tractable. Since the two methods are complementary in nature. researchers have found it 
natural to use one as a solution to a problem with the other. The systems discussed above 
integrate EBL and SBL in this way. 
A discussion and critique of each system has been presented. A major Criticism of all 
the systems. not yet addressed. is that in augmenting one system with another. entirely new 
problems are necessarily introduced. Specifically. when SBL is introduced into an EBL system. 
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it cannot be assumed that SBL will work peJfectly. The same is true when EBL is incorporated 
to solve a problem of SBL. The problems of potential domain theory incompleteness. 
incorrectness. and intractability are introduced into the composite system. Although the 
methods are complementary. one might conjecture that the pieces alone are not enough. 
Rather. they need to be expanded into a mechanism of mutual interaction between the parts. 
I. A Summary of Selected Systems Addressing Problems of 
Explanation-Based Learning 
PROBLEM SYSTEM APPROACH SAMPLE DOMAIN 
INCOMPLETENESS 
Rajamoney's ADEPT Auxillary theory Physical processes 
for experimentation 








Pazzani's OCCA.\f Auxiliary theory 
of causality 






Large search space 
Large search space 
and Small links 
EffiCient definition 
match 













for generation of 
bctter explanations 











to slmp\lfy theory 
EBLand SBL 
In parallel until 





















II. A Summary of Selected Systems Addressing Problems of 
Similarity-Based Learning 




Context-sensitive Flann & Dietter1ch's EBL translates to Checkers No 
representation Wyl operational 
representation 
Context-sensitive Stepp & Michalski EBL to select No 
representation and convert features 
to better terms 
Creating new terms Utgoffs STABB EBL to generate Symbolic Yes 
new terms integration 
CUTTING SEARCH 
Feature focus Salzberg's Find features that Horse racing No 
HANDICAPPER contradict theory 
Feature focus Swaminathan Theory gives set 
of features for 
Epidemiology No 
consideration 
Feature focus Danyluk's Gemini Relevance, context. Network fault No 
and matching diagnosis 
of explanations as 
input to SBL 
Feature focus Van Lehn's SIERRA Explanation, or parse, Arithmetic Yes 
indicates new disjunct procedures 
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